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All the parties to the proceedings below are listed in the caption. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Article 
VIII, Section 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2Q). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. 1 Jul llii1 IIKII ( milt H I III nullum, llial, ,r i in illcr of law pLtintitTfailed to 
demonstrate through expert testimony or other evidence presented, that defendant breached the 
applicable standai d :>f cai e ai id that the bi eacl i pi oximately caused plaint i f fs injury? 
S tandard of Review: "Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the 
same standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference to a trial court's legal 
conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal 
result obtains." Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 , 824 (Utah App. 1989.) 
Reference to Record: Issue number one w a s raised in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support o f Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-67. ) The issue was also 
.mifift'ssed in I he * null \ Kulmj', dafnl brbniiij , V^Hi and the in I \ (In In daled Man h I, 
1996. (R. 132-133 and 191-194.) 
2 . Did th :!: ti ial coui t ei i in i i ilii ig that I Jtah la K does not expi essl> recognize 
a battery claim based upon a patient's withdrawal o f consent for medical treatment? 
S tandard of Review: "Appel la te cour ts scrutinize summary judgments under the 
same standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference to a trial court's legal 
1 
conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal 
result obtains." Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App. 1989.) 
Reference to Record: Issue number two was raised in Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 68-70.) The issue was also addressed in the 
court's Minute Entry dated January 30, 1996, the court's Ruling dated February 7, 1996 and the 
court's Order dated March 1, 1996. (R. 127, 132-133 and 191-194.) 
3. Assuming arguendo that Utah law recognizes causes of action based upon 
a patient's withdrawal of consent for medical treatment, did the trial court err in ruling that the 
evidence presented by plaintiff is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish that defendant's 
radiology technician acted with the requisite intent to establish a battery? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court examines the lower court's conclusions 
of law and reviews them for correctness. English v. Kienke, 11r4 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Reference to Record: Issue number three was addressed in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 67-68.) The issue was also 
addressed in the court's Minute Entry dated January 30, 1996, the court's Ruling dated February 
7, 1996, and the court's Order dated March 1, 1996. (R. 127, 132-133 and 191-194.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment granted on 
all claims made by plaintiff against defendant. 
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B. The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. On 
November 11, 1993, Travis Olsen ("Olsen") filed a medical malpractice complaint against 
defendant Intermountain Health Care doing bi isiness as P1 " * ini [ ,l l| 'ildren's ? fedical Center 
("PCMC"), alleging negligence and intentional battery. (R. i -'- On January 10, 1996, PCMC 
rind .in .ifliddvil |K Ml fil 
and 62-82). PCMC argued that Olsen could not maintain his claim of medical malpractice due to 
a lack of expert testimony to establish a standard of care, a breach of the standard and the 
causation of damages. PCMC also argued that a claim of battery could not be sustained because 
Utah does not expressly recognize a claim for battery based upon withdrawal of consent and 
because the facts of this case do not establish a legally sufficient withdrawal of consent. Finally, 
PCMC argued that Olsen could not support his claim for punitive damages and that summary 
judgment was appropriate on the punitive damages claim ;is n nulla of Liw. (R. 62- 82.) 
Olsen filed a memorandum in opposition to PCMC's motion for summary 
the affidavit of Gary L. Halversen, M.D. on January 18, 1996. (R. 124-126). Oral argument was 
^judgmen » 
strike. After considering the oral arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda, the court 
liijiid'il 1*1 Mi fiH.iimi tin Jiiiinuiiy judgment . ittery claim an 
punitive damages claim. The court also denied Olsen's motion to strike and took PCMC's 
motion for summary judgment with respect to the malpractice/negligence claim under 
3 
advisement. (R. 127,132-133). After further consideration of the malpractice/negligence claim, 
the court granted PCMC's motion for summary judgment in total. (R. 132-133.) 
Olsen filed his notice of appeal on March 19, 1996. (R. 198-200). Olsen filed his 
appellate brief on June 3, 1996. Olsen does not challenge the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on the punitive damage claim, nor does Olsen challenge the trial court's denial of 
Olsen's motion to strike. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. This case is a medical malpractice action in which Olsen contends that 
PCMC's radiology technician, Dan Offret ("Offret"), injured Olsen while positioning him for a 
post-operative x-ray of the pelvis. (R. 63.) 
2. At the time of Olsen's surgery on March 20, 1991, Olsen had a lengthy 
history of suffering from cerebral palsy and related right hip pain. (R. 63.) 
3. On March 20, 1991, Dr. Stephen Santora ("Dr. Santora") performed a 
procedure known as a Salter Pelvic Osteotomy, a procedure in which a wedge of bone is inserted 
in the pelvis to correct an improper angle of the hip. (R. 63.) 
4. In the first surgery, Dr. Santora used two bone screws to anchor the wedge 
of bone to the osteotomy site. (R. 63.) 
5. On March 23, 1991, Olsen underwent a pelvic X-ray that was performed 
by PCMC's radiology technician, Offret. (R. 63.) 
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6. Proper positioning for the x-ray ordered by Dr. Santora would involve 
placing the patient on his back on the x-ray table, putting the patient's feet together and 
spreading the knees apart approximately fifteen degrees from the mid-line of the boc ^ . 64.) 
7. During positioning for the x-ray, Olsen claims that Offret treated him 
rough! ••• • . ) 
8. Olsen claims that he screamed in pain and told Offret to stop the 
procctluir m, l< M ) 
9. Olsen claims that he heard and felt a "pop" in the hip area during the x-ray 
procedure,,, (R 64.) 
I A post-operative pelvic x-ray of March 23, 1991, revealed that the screws 
which had anchored the wedge of bone had pulled out slightly, causing the osteotomy to slip. 
(R.64.) 
11. Olsen claims that the rough treatment by Offret caused the osteotomy to 
thereby giving rise to •* --reJ r - ?K ., .* . on. (R.64.) 
Dr. Santora has testified that the osteotomy could have slipped during 
transferred to and from bed or elsewhere. (R. 64.) 
13. t 
radiologist, establishes that if the osteotomy slipped during positioning for an x-ray, it could 
hav e ione so w ithout any negligence on the part of the radiology technician. | R o.S and '7- 78.) 
5 
14. Dr. Santora performed a second operation on March 25, 1991 to correct 
the slipped osteotomy. (R. 65.) 
15. During the second surgery, Dr. Santora used a plate and three screws to 
affix the wedge of bone to the osteotomy site. (R. 65.) 
16. The second surgery was successful and produced a result equal to that 
achieved after the first surgery. (R. 65.) 
17. PCMC's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff of April 14, 1994, 
requested that Olsen identify all expert witnesses who would testify concerning the standard of 
care in this case. (R. 65.) 
18. In answering Interrogatory No. 17 in Olsen's Answers to PCMC's First 
Set of Interrogatories of August 18, 1994, Olsen stated: 
Plaintiff has not determined whether he will call any expert witness at 
trial. If such a determination is made, this Answer will be supplemented. 
(R. 65.) 
19. Olsen never supplemented his original Answer and never identified an 
expert witness. (R. 65.) 
20. Olsen's Designation of Witnesses of September 19, 1995, failed to 
identify any expert who could testify concerning the standard of care for radiology technicians in 
this case. (R. 66.) 
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Olsen cannot establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against PCMC. 
Olsen cannot establish & prima facie case of battery against PCMC. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST PCMC. 
In order to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, Olsen 
"provide expert testimony to establish: (1) The standard of care, Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 
7A\ In W1Y ,M l lnf i , I I 10 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ; (2 ) defendant'.1. Inilim to <:nmpl\ with tint standard \iuli>n 
v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); and (3) that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries, 
Huggi 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)." Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Further, issues of fact which are outside 
knowledge of lay persons must be established by expert testimony." Id. Failure to produce 
expert testimony is fatal to a medical malpractice claim. In Nixdorf, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted: "Expert testimony is required because the nature of the profession removes the 
particularities of the practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen." 612 
P.2d at 352. Failure to provide expert testimony is grounds for dismissal on a motion for 
summary judgment. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993). 
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With respect to this case, Olsen must demonstrate through expert testimony that 
PCMC's radiology technician, Offret, deviated from the standard of care. The expert testimony 
must establish that the osteotomy slipped during the X-ray positioning of March 23, 1991, and 
that the slip occurred as a result of negligence on the part of Offret. Olsen, however, did not 
identify a single expert to support any element, let alone every element, of his medical 
malpractice claim against PCMC. The absence of an expert notwithstanding, Olsen claims that 
he can establish the standard of care and breach thereof with the testimony of Dr. Santora and 
Offret. This approach has, and should, prove fatal to Olsen's medical malpractice action against 
PCMC. 
A. Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dr. Santora To Establish A 
Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice Against PCMC. 
Although Dr. Santora has not been named as an expert in this matter, he was 
deposed during the discovery phase of the trial court litigation. Olsen has tried to "bootstrap" his 
testimony into the expert support that he is required to present for his malpractice claims against 
PCMC. In this regard, Olsen argues that Dr. Santora gave an "opinion" that the injury suffered 
by ". . . Olsen 'probably' occurred in x-ray." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17) This mischaracterizes Dr. 
Santora's testimony. 
Olsen's counsel specifically asked Dr. Santora if he had formed a 50% conclusion 
as to where Olsen's osteotomy slip occurred and he said "Yeah . . . I'd probably say x-ray." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12, citing R. 112-14) Dr. Santora also testified that" . . . I understand that 
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something happened in x-ray, and it certainly could have happened. I'm not downgrading that at 
all, but it could have happened somewhere else possibly." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12, citing R. 
112-14) Notably, Olsen's counsel did not even ask Dr. Santora the obvious question of whether 
he felt, within the parameters of "reasonable medical probability," that the osteotomy slip 
occurred during the x-ray positioning process. 
In sum, Dr. Santora testified that he could not offer better than even odds that the 
osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray positioning process. Such testimony does not rise 
above "guess, speculation, or conjecture" and, as such, it does not satisfy the evidentiary 
standard established for experts in medical malpractice cases. (See citation to Jones on 
Evidence, Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953) and State v. Jarrell, 608 
P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), Appellant's Brief, p. 16-17) Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Santora 
cannot be relied upon by Olsen to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against 
PCMC. 
B. Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dan Offret To Establish A 
Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice Against PCMC. 
Olsen claims that Offret"... established the standard of care and his own failure 
to comply with the standard." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17) Olsen elaborates by arguing that "Mr. 
Offret's testimony established that the standard of care for radiology technicians required him to 
follow the doctor's instructions, and to immediately cease positioning a patient when there are 
complaints of pain." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). This argument is fraught with deficiencies. 
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Contrary to Olseris assertions, Offret did not establish the standard of care 
applicable to him and the breach thereof during the course of his deposition. Offret testified that 
he received an Associates of Applied Science degree in radiologic technology from Weber State 
College. He also testified that he received training in patient contact in communication. In this 
regard, Offret testified that when patients complain of pain it is desirable to make them as 
comfortable as possible. He also testified that one should not hurt a patient. Finally, he testified 
that in some circumstances if a patient complains of pain during the positioning process, the 
technician may discontinue the positioning process and return the patient to their room or wait 
until the patient is comfortable with the positioning process. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13-14, citing 
R. 114-116.) 
This testimony does not establish the standard of care applicable to radiology 
technicians or a breach thereof under the facts of Olsen's case. Offret's testimony is nothing 
more than a statement of very general principles. Offret's testimony is supported by that of Dr. 
Santora, in which he states that all patients are in some degree of pain when they are undergoing 
post-operative x-ray procedures. He testified: 
Q Would you expect an x-ray technician at Primary Children's Hospital to 
stop a procedure if the patient was complaining of pain, of tremendous 
pain? 
A I'm not sure if I could speak for them. I'm sure there are times that they 
can't do procedures because the patients are uncooperative maybe 
secondary to pain, but a lot of the procedures that are done there are done 
on children, at least in the orthopedic room, on children with fractures and 
broken bones and they are quite painful and most of the time you need to 
10 
get an x-ray, so I'm sure a lot of the procedures are done under fairly 
vocal objections by a lot of the kids up there. 
(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.) 
In sum, Offret's testimony cited by Olsen does not, and cannot, establish a prima 
facie case of medical malpractice in this matter. 
C. Olsen Has Not Produced Any Competent Expert Testimony Or 
Evidence To Rebut The Affidavit Of Gary L. Halversen, M.D. 
The Affidavit of Gary L. Halversen, M.D. was offered in support of PCMC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 77-82). This Affidavit establishes that an osteotomy slip 
such as that sustained by Olsen could occur during the x-ray positioning process. That Affidavit 
also states, however, that even if the osteotomy slip did occur during the x-ray positioning 
process, the slipping is not necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the radiology 
technician. This Affidavit establishes that even if one accepts the proposition that Olsen's 
osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray positioning process, the osteotomy slip was not 
necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the radiology technician. 
Dr. Halversen's Affidavit was not rebutted by Olsen during the course of the trial 
court proceedings. Similarly, his Affidavit was not rebutted in any way by Olsen in his 
Appellate Brief. Therefore, Olsen has not produced any qualified expert witness testimony to 
define the standard of care applicable to radiology technicians and to testify that there was a 
breach of that standard in this matter. To the contrary, however, PCMC has provided competent 
expert testimony which demonstrates that even if the osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray 
11 
positioning process, such a slip was not necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the 
radiology technician. This evidence in uncontradicted by Olsen. Olsen has failed to establish a 
prima facie case of medical malpractice and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of PCMC must be sustained.1 
POINT n 
OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
BATTERY AGAINST PCMC 
A. Utah Has Never Expressly Recognized A Claim For Battery Where A 
Patient Claims To Have Withdrawn Consent, 
In Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of 
Appeals recognized an independent claim against a health care provider based upon the common 
law claim of battery. In Lounsbury, the plaintiff claimed he never gave consent to the physician 
for a back surgery that the physician performed. The Utah Court of Appeals stated with respect 
to the battery claim: 
It appears well settled that the battery theory remains applicable where a 
medical treatment or procedure is completely unauthorized, whereas the 
doctrine of informed consent, grounded in negligence principles, applies 
to the much more frequently encountered situation where the treatment or 
procedure was authorized, but proper disclosure of the risks inherent and 
the treatment was not given. 
1It is also important to note that Olsen has not provided any competent evidence, expert 
or otherwise, that the alleged breach of the standard of care by Offret proximately caused the 
injuries of which he complains. Thus, Olsen has not satisfied any of the elements of & prima 
facie medical malpractice case. 
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Id. at 193-194. The Utah Court of Appeals was not presented with and did not address the 
situation in which the patient claims that valid consent was withdrawn during the course of a 
procedure. Olsen has no valid legal basis upon which he can assert a claim for intentional 
battery in this case. 
B. Even If Utah Law Recognizes A Claim For Intentional Battery Based 
Upon Withdrawn Consent, Olsen Cannot Establish A Prima Facie 
Case Of Intentional Battery In This Matter. 
In jurisdictions which recognize a claim for battery based upon withdrawn 
consent, the cause of action is typically described as follows: 
After treatment or examination of the patient has begun, the patient's 
consent previously given may be withdrawn, subjecting the physician to 
liability for assault and battery if the treatment or examination is 
continued. However, the withdrawal of consent must be unequivocal, 
made while the patient is rational, and it must be medically feasible to 
desist without danger to the patient's health. 
61 Am.Jur.2d § 174 at 305. Olsen's complaint of pain during the x-ray positioning process do 
not constitute unequivocal withdrawal of consent. 
A two part test for evaluating claims of assault based upon withdrawn consent 
was developed by the court in Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 138 S.E.2d 902 (1964). In 
Mims, the plaintiff complained of extreme pain during the administration of a painful barium 
enema. The plaintiff complained of extreme pain and begged the radiology technician and 
physician to stop the procedure. The Court of Appeals stated: 
To constitute an effective withdrawal of consent as a matter after 
treatment or examination is in progress commensurate to subject medical 
13 
practitioners to liability for assault and battery of treatment or examination 
is continued, two distinct things are required: 
1) A patient must act or use language which can be subject to 
no other inference and which must be unquestioned responses from a clear 
and rational mind. These actions and utterances of the patient must be 
such as to leave no room for doubt in the minds of reasonable men that in 
view of all of the circumstances consent was actually withdrawn. 
2) When medical treatments or examinations occurring with 
the patient's consent are proceeding in a manner requiring bodily contact 
by the physician with the patient and consent to the contact is revoked, it 
must be medically feasible for the doctor to desist in the treatment or 
examination at that point without the cessation being detrimental to the 
patient's health or life from a medical viewpoint. 
Id. at 907. With respect to whether the Mims plaintiff had unequivocally revoked her consent, 
the court stated that mere protestations of pain and discomfort were insufficient to establish 
withdrawal of consent. 
This testimony merely shows protestations by the plaintiff for pain and 
discomfort and disagreement with the defendants in the manner they 
administered the barium enema. That is not enough. 
Id at 908 
In this case, Olsen consented to the osteotomy slip procedure and follow up care 
attendant thereto. Although Olsen testified that he was experiencing pain during the x-ray 
positioning process and that he communicated this pain to the radiology technician and asked 
him to stop, these protestations of pain were nothing more significant than those expressions of 
pain he had been making since the conclusion of his first osteotomy surgery. 
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The medical records in this case demonstrate that Olsen was complaining of pain 
and discomfort after the first surgery. Dr. Santora's note of March 22, 1991, the day before the 
subject x-ray, notes "Complains of pain in the right leg - out of proportion somewhat." When 
asked about this point in his deposition, Dr. Santora testified: 
Q What did you mean out of position proportionally? 
A Well it is a very subjective comment really because when you do these 
sorts of surgeries you have an idea of how much pain the patient will have 
following the surgery, and sometimes we treat kids where you think they 
are just having more pain than they should for the type of surgery you get. 
It certainly doesn't mean they're not having it. It just means that they may 
either have a low pain threshold, something could have happened that 
caused them more pain. 
The osteotomy could have slipped before, although he was basically bed 
rested at that point, and we were just starting to get him up with physical 
therapy, so its a little bit of a subjective comment in the notes the thing 
that I thought he was hurting a little more than he should have been at that 
point after the surgery. 
(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Santora also testified: 
Q Would you expect an x-ray technician at Primary Children's Hospital to 
stop a procedure if the patient was complaining of pain, of tremendous 
pain? 
A I'm not sure if I could speak for them. I'm sure there are times that they 
can't do procedures because the patients are uncooperative maybe 
secondary to pain, but a lot of the procedures that are done there are done 
on children, at least in the orthopedic room, on children with fractures and 
15 
broken bones and they are quite painful and most of the time you need to 
get an x-ray, so I'm sure a lot of the procedures are done under fairly 
vocal objections bv a lot of the kids up there. 
(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.) 
In sum, Olsen complained of disproportionate pain even before his x-ray of 
March 23, 1991. Dr. Santora testified that x-rays of this nature are frequently done under 
circumstances where there are vocal complaints of pain, especially in situations involving child 
patients. Oflret simply did not have the type of unequivocal withdrawal of consent that would 
put him on notice that continuing with the x-ray positioning would constitute battery. Olsen's 
protestations of pain and discomfort are not legally sufficient to establish a claim for battery. 
Therefore, Olsen cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional battery even if one exists 
under Utah law. 
Finally, it must be highlighted that Olsen appears to be challenging the trial 
court's factual findings underlying its conclusion that the facts of this matter are insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to establish that Offret acted with a requisite intent to establish a battery even if 
such a claim is recognized in Utah. (R. 193). To successfully challenge a trial court's factual 
findings, a plaintiff "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 
P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994). Olsen failed to marshall the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding that even if there is a cause of action for battery based upon withdrawal of 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment in favor of PCMC should be affirmed. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 1996. 
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CURTIS J. DRAKE 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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